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I. Introduction and Summary of Conclusions∗
A. Issues
This memorandum addresses international law on the issue whether a member of
a private army may be held culpable for his conduct in subjecting other members of his
own army to violent initiation rites and hazing that result in wounding, maiming, or
death. The first part of this memorandum identifies the relevant provisions of the Statute
of the Special Court of Sierra Leone giving the court its jurisdictional base, and then
explains how the Martens Clause of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions
may be properly invoked and applied to the present issue. The second part of this
memorandum addresses and analyzes various treaties and conventions on torture in hopes
of drawing a parallel between initiation rights, on the one hand, and hazing and torture on
the other. The third part of this memorandum discusses current trends in international law
on the issue of military hazing.
B. Summary of Conclusions
(1) The Martens Clause, as Articulated in Additional Protocol I of the
Geneva Conventions, Authorizes this Court to Look to Humanitarian Law
and Customary International Law as Means of Addressing and Defining
New War Crime Violations.
Articles 2 and 3 of the Statute for the Special Court of Sierra Leone limit this
court’s jurisdiction to crimes committed against civilian populations and against prisoners
of war. Since the issue presented here for consideration deals with what we may call
“friendly soldiers,” Articles 2 and 3 are inapplicable to the issue presented. However,
Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions contains a version of the Martens
∗

ISSUE: In the course of initiating members who consent to join a private army, some members are killed,
wounded and maimed. Can the prosecution lead such evidence in support of the crimes charged in the
indictment? Under international criminal law can a member of a private army be culpable for killing a
member of his own army? The deceased member is neither a civilian nor and enemy combatant.

Clause, originally formulated in the Preamble to the 1899 Hague Convention, that
authorizes this court to look to humanitarian law and the principles of customary
international law for direction in addressing and defining new war crimes.
(2) Humanitarian Law, Namely Treaties and Conventions on Torture,
Support the Proposition that Military Initiation Rites and Hazing May
Properly Be Categorized as War Crimes.
Torture conventions and treaties, specifically the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights of 1970, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, the
1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, the 1953 Convention for the Protection and Fundamental Freedoms, and the
1969 American Convention on Human Rights, do not discriminate against individuals on
the basis of status. Whereas Articles 2 and 3 of the Statute of the Special Court of Sierra
Leone apply only to atrocities committed against civilians and prisoners of war, the plain
language of the aforementioned treaties and conventions makes it clear that any person,
regardless of status, may claim their protection. Instances of initiation rites and hazing,
however, may still have to be evaluated on a case by case basis to determine whether the
act in question rises to the level of torture. Assuming that a parallel may be drawn
between hazing and torture, there is humanitarian law that suggests that we may properly
categorize hazing as a war crime, and therefore within the jurisdiction of this court via the
Martens Clause of Additional Protocol I.
(3) State Practice Supports the Proposition that Hazing Prohibitions
Constitute Customary International Law.
Although the task of establishing policies and laws against hazing as principles of
customary international law is beyond the scope of this memorandum, an analysis of
some countries’ anti-hazing policies or laws is helpful in demonstrating a global trend

toward banning violent military initiation and hazing. Analysis of the policies and laws in
the United States, Canada, the Philippines, Taiwan, Kazakhstan, Latvia and Russia
present a broad global picture of the already established and the still evolving practice of
states with regard to military hazing rituals and initiation rites. The policies and laws of
the aforementioned countries indicate a global trend towards prosecuting and punishing
individuals that participate in acts of hazing in the military. By applying the precepts of
the Martens Clause, this court may then prosecute instances of hazing as war crimes.
II. Factual Background
Since 1991, Sierra Leone and its people have been the victims of a vicious civil
war. At last report, nearly 100,000 people have been killed, and millions have been
forced to flee from their homes.1 Over the last decade, the Revolutionary United Front
(RUF) has been the most violent aggressor in this conflict. Primarily motivated by power
and greed, the RUF has attempted to gain control over Sierra Leone’s diamond trade.2
These attempts have nearly always ended in long cycles of brutality. By 1994, the RUF
had gained control of large portions of diamond-rich areas of the country.3 This, however,
was not done through political means, but rather through the use of violence to gain
access to and power over political structures in the country.4 Such tactics have come to be
known generally as the “campaign of terror” and they include murdering adult men,

1

Youth Ambassadors for Peace, Sierra Leone: In Depth,
http://www.freethechildren.org/peace/childrenandwar/slindepth.html [hereinafter Sierra Leone in Depth]
(last viewed Apr. 14, 2004). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 29.]
2

Id.

3

Id.

4

Id.

raping women and girls, abducting young men, and generally creating a fearful
environment for the civilians of Sierra Leone.5
The RUF’s cycle of brutality, however, affects not only Sierra Leone’s civilian
population, but also the RUF’s own members.6 The information available in regards to
incidents and practices of hazing within the RUF is restricted to those practices as
applicable to child soldiers. However, for the purpose of this introduction and the rest of
the memorandum we may assume that these practices apply equally to the RUF’s adult
recruits. Youth Ambassadors for Peace, a subsection of the Free the Children movement,
reports that the most common hazing practices in the RUF are food deprivation, forced
amputation of fingers, noses, ears, and limbs, and execution.7 On July 23, 2001, the UN
Security Council approved the creation of the Special Court for Sierra Leone in order to
prosecute people accused of crimes against humanity and war crimes applicable in this
conflict.8
III. The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict
A. General Background
The Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone9 grants the court jurisdiction to
prosecute persons for “Crimes Against Humanity” as defined under Article 2 and for

5

Id.

6

Youth Ambassadors for Peace, Child Soldiers: In Depth,
http://www.freethechildren.org/peace/childrenandwar/soldiersindepth.html [hereinafter Child Soldiers in
Depth] (last viewed Apr. 14, 2004). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 31.]
7

Id.

8

Sierra Leone in Depth, supra note 1, at 6. [Reproduce in accompanying notebook at Tab 29.]

9

Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N. Doc. S/2000/915 (2000), available at
http://www.sierra-leone.org/specialcourtstatute.html. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 9.]

“Violations of Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol
II as detailed in Article 3. Unfortunately, neither of these articles is applicable to
atrocities committed by members of a private army against fellow members in that army.
As defined by Article 2, “Crimes against Humanity” applies only to attacks against
civilian populations10, and the 1949 Geneva Conventions, which give Article 3 its
jurisdictional authority, apply solely to prisoners of war and to civilians in time of war11.
However, the Martens Clause of the 1949 Geneva Conventions may provide the court
with the requisite jurisdiction over hazing and related crimes.
As originally formulated in the Preamble to the 1899 Hague Convention12 with
respect to the laws and customs of war on land, the Martens Clause read:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the High
Contracting Parties think it right to declare that in cases not included in the
Regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under
the protection and empire of the principles of international law, as they
result from the usages established between civilized nations, from the laws
of humanity and the requirements of the public conscience.13
The clause’s original intent is revealed in the Preamble to the Hague Convention: Cases
not provided for in the Convention “should [not] for want of a written provision be left to

10

Id. at Art. 2.

11

Id. at Art. 3.

12

“The clause was based upon and took its name form a declaration read by Professor von Martens, the
Russian delegate at the Hague Peace Conferences 1899. Martens introduced the declaration after delegates
at the Hague Peace Conference failed to agree on the issue of the status of civilians who took up arms
against an occupying force… Although the clause was originally formulated to resolve this particular
dispute, it has subsequently reappeared in various but similar versions in later treaties regulating armed
conflicts.” Rupert Ticehurst, The Martens Clause and the Laws of Armed Conflict, INT’L REV. RED CROSS,
1, available at www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList133/
32AEA038821EA35EC1256B66005A747C (last viewed Feb. 16, 2004). [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 24.]
13

See generally Helmut Strebel, Martens Clause, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
252 (Rudolph Bernhardt ed., 1982). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 21.]

the arbitrary judgment of the military commanders.”14 In the case of In re Krupp and
others, 15 Ann. Dig. 620, 622 (U.S. Mil. Trib. 1948), the U.S. Military Tribunal saw fit
to expound upon the Martens Clause, stating:
The Preamble is much more than a pious declaration. It is a general clause,
making the usages established among civilized nations, the laws of
humanity and the dictates of public conscience into the legal yardstick to
be applied when the specific provisions of the Convention and the
Regulations annexed to it do not cover specific cases occurring in warfare,
or concomitant to warfare.15
In 1949, the drafters of the Geneva Conventions included a Martens Clause in
their denunciation clauses16 in order to achieve a somewhat different goal: to ensure that
if any parties should denounce the Conventions, they would still remain bound by
customary international law, the laws of humanity, and the dictates of public conscience.
The provision therefore guaranteed that international customary law would still apply to
states no longer bound by the Geneva Conventions as treaty law.17
Since the creation of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in 1977,
a modernized version of the Martens Clause has emerged. Notably, although the Martens
Clause first appeared in the preamble to the 1973 draft of Additional Protocol I, the 1977
Diplomatic Conference, underlining the continued importance of the Clause, moved it to
the substantive text and provisions of the Protocol.18 Protocol I, Article 1(2) provides: “In

14

Theodor Meron, The Hague Peace Conferences: The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and
Dictates of Public Conscience, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 78, 1 (2000). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 22.]
15

Meron, supra note 14, at 2, citing In re Krupp and others, 15 Ann. Dig. 620, 622 (U.S. Mil. Trib. 1948).
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22.]

16

See generally Common Articles 62, 63, 142, and 158.

17

Meron, supra note 14, at 2. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22.]

cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and
combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international
law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from dictates
of public conscience.”19 This “modernized” version of the clause therefore acts as a
principle of interpretation that rules out “an a contrario interpretation since, where there
[is] no formal obligation, there [will] always [be] some duty stemming from international
law.”20
B. Employing the Martens Clause
i. International Precedent
The Martens Clause calls for the consideration of principles of international law,
principles of humanity, and dictates of public conscience when analyzing cases falling
outside of the purview of the Geneva Conventions. This consideration has been utilized
by many international courts and organizations. In the merits phase of Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, for example, the International Court of
Justice stated that “the conduct of the United States may be judged according to the
fundamental general principles of humanitarian law” and that the rules detailed in
Common Article 3 “constitute a minimum yardstick, in addition to the more elaborate
rules which are also to apply to international conflicts; and they are rules which, in the
Court’s opinion, reflect what the Court in 1949 called ‘elementary considerations of

18

Ticehurst, supra note 12, at 1. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24.]

19

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 1(2), opened for signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3,
reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 6.]

20

Meron, supra note 14, at 2, citing 8 DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE ON THE REAFFIRMATION AND
DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS, OFFICIAL RECORDS, Doc.
CDDH/I/SR.3, ¶ 11 (1978). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22.]

humanity’.”21 This same statement was invoked by UN Secretary General in the report on
the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia:
In this context [of crimes against humanity], it is to be noted that the
International Court of Justice has recognized that the prohibitions
contained in Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions are
based on ‘elementary considerations of humanity’ and cannot be breached
in an armed conflict, regardless of whether it is international or internal in
character.22
In the Furundzija case, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
embraced the Martens Clause and the UN Secretary General’s aforementioned
declaration, turning to the Martens Clause in order to support the proposition that the
prohibition of torture is a part of customary international law.23
Perhaps the most striking example of the relevance and continued importance of
the Martens Clause is the International Court of Justice’s Advisory Opinion on the
legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons issued on July 8, 1996, wherein the court
determined that the Martens Clause was a customary rule, and therefore of normative
status.24 The Opinion itself “merely referred to the Martens Clause by stating that ‘it
proved to be an effective means of addressing the rapid evolution of military
technology’,” but “[s]tate submissions and some of the dissenting opinions provide[] very

21

Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 ICJ. REP,
113-114, ¶ 218 (June 27) (Emphasis added). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 17.]

22

Meron, supra note 14, at 82, citing Report of the Secretary General pursuant to paragraph 2 of the
Security Council Resolution 808, ¶ 48 n.9, UN Doc. S/25704 (1993). [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 22.]

23

Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Judgment, No. IT-95-17/1-T, ¶ 137 (Dec. 10, 1998). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 18.]

24

Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 95 (Jul. 8). [hereinafter Weapons].
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 37.]

interesting insight into its meaning.”25 The Russian Federation, for example, contended in
its submission that the Martens Clause was redundant, and therefore irrelevant, because a
complete code of the laws of war had been established by the 1949 Geneva Conventions
and the Additional Protocols.26 In its written submission, the United Kingdom argued that
the absence of a relevant treaty provision does not implicitly mean that nuclear weapons
are lawful. The United Kingdom went on to argue that the Martens Clause alone could
not establish the illegality of nuclear weapons. Rather, it contended that it was necessary
to point to some rule of customary international law in order for a prohibition to exist.27
In his dissent to the ICJ’s opinion, Judge Koroma objected to the United Kingdom’s
suggested approach, stating, “the futile quest for specific legal prohibition can only be
attributable to an extreme form of positivism.”28 Echoing this sentiment, Judge
Shahabuddeen in his dissent stated that “[i]t is difficult to see what norm of State conduct
[the Martens Clause] lays down if all it does is to remind States of norms of conduct
which exist totally dehors the Clause.”29 One legal scholar has commented, “Judge
Shahabuddeen is clearly of the opinion that the Martens Clause is not simply a reminder
of the existence of other norms of international law not contained in a specific treaty- it

25

Ticehurst, supra note 12, at 1. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24.]

26

Ticehurst., supra note 12, at 1, citing Russian Federation, written submission on the Advisory Opinion
of the ICJ, Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, requested by the General Assembly, at 13.
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24.]
27

Ticehurst, supra note 12, at 1-2, citing United Kingdom, written submission on the Advisory Opinion of
the ICJ, Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, requested by the General Assembly, at 21.
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24.]

28

Weapons, supra note 13 (dissenting opinion of Judge Koroma, at 14). [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook at Tab 37.]

29

Weapons, supra note 13 (dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, at 21). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 37.]

has a normative status in its own right and therefore works independently of other
norms.”30
The Martens Clause is potentially useful to the Special Court because, through its
reference to “principle of international law”, “principles of humanity”, and “the dictates
of public conscience”, it allows the Court to invoke customary norms of international
law, international humanitarian law, and public sentiments in order to define war crime
prohibitions. In the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear
weapons, for example, Judge Shahabuddeen noted in his the dissent the importance of
numerous United Nations General Assembly resolutions condemning the use of nuclear
weapons.31 Although none of these resolutions was ever adopted unanimously, and
therefore was unlikely to establish a rule of customary international law, Judge
Shahabuddeen concluded that the “dictates of public conscience”, as demonstrated in the
United Nations General Assembly resolutions, could still be interpreted to oppose the use
of nuclear weapons in all circumstances.32
Judge Shahabuddeen’s position on the relevance of the Martens Clause was
strongly supported by various states’ submissions to the ICJ. In its submission, Australia
stated that “[t]he question is not whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons is
consistent with any of these instruments, but whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons
is per se consistent with general principles of humanity.”33 Japan similarly argued,

30

Ticehurst, supra note 12, at 2. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24.]

31

Notably, Judge Shahabuddeen referred to U.N.G.A. resolution 38/75 (15 December, 1983).

32

Weapons, supra note 13 (dissenting opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, at 16). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 37.]

“because of their immense power to cause destruction, death and injury to human beings,
the use of nuclear weapons is clearly contrary to the spirit of humanity that gives
international law its philosophical foundation.”34
ii. Application of the Martens Clause
The problem with the application of the Martens Clause to any international legal
issue is that there is no one accepted interpretation of the meaning and proper invocation
of the clause. It is therefore subject to various legal interpretations, both narrow and
expansive. At its narrowest and most restrictive, the Martens Clause acts as a mere
reminder that customary international law applies even after the adoption of a treaty or
provision.35 A less restrictive interpretation is that the inherent inability of international
treaties on the law of armed conflict to provide a complete and codified list of specific
prohibitions puts the Martens Clause in a position to provide that something that is not
explicitly prohibited by a treaty is not necessarily ipso facto permitted.36 The broadest
interpretation is that the Martens Clause provides that conduct in armed conflict is subject
to not only treaty norms and provisions, but also to the principles of international law
referred to in the text of the Clause.

33

Ticehurst, supra note 12, at 3, citing Legality of the threat of nuclear weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 95 (Jul. 8):
Australia, oral argument before the ICJ, at 21. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24.]

34

Ticehurst, supra note 12, at 3, citing 42. Legality of the threat of nuclear weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 95 (Jul. 8):
Japan, oral statement before the ICJ, at 57. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24.]

35

Ticehurst, supra note 12, at 1, citing Christopher Greenwood, Historical Development and Legal Basis,
THE HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICTS, 28, at 129 (Oxford University Press 1995).
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 24.]

36

Meron, supra note 14, at 81, citing Yves Sandoz, et al., COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS
OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, 39, at 55 (ICRC/Martinus Nijhoff,
Geneva 1987). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 22.]

Rupert Ticehurst takes the position that the present debate over the meaning and
relevance of the Martens Clause may ultimately be reduced to the conflict and debate
between legal positivism (“positive law”) and natural law.
Through a positivist interpretation of international law, States that do not
consent to being bound by treaty norms or to the development of
customary rules remain outside the regime governed by those norms:
subjugation to a positive norm is dependent of the will of the State. . . If
that will is absent, the State is not bound by that norm and so is not
responsible to the international community for non-observance of it.37
In stark contrast, Ticehurst continues, “natural law is universal, binding all people and all
States. It is therefore a non-consensual law based upon the notion of the prevalence of
right and justice.”38 As is evidenced by the aforementioned states’ submissions to the ICJ,
great pressure has been placed on international courts to look beyond the positive norms
of international law and to consider and rely on norms of “natural law”. “The Martens
Clause supports this position as it indicates that the laws of armed conflict do not simply
provide a positive legal code, they also provide a moral code.”39 This “moral code” as
well as its roots in natural law are desirable for the international community. As opposed
to national legal systems, the international legal community does not have a central lawmaking body. Instead, international legal systems are decentralized because their
development is largely dependent on widespread consensus of States to norms of positive
law, created either through the treaty process or through the slow development of
customary rules of international law. It is because of this inevitable decentralization of
the international legal community that positive law has proven itself ineffective in
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addressing new developments and issues in the area of war crimes. New developments in
military technology, for example, as well as current problems within the military, are
forced onto the “back burner”, so to speak, until some positive norm emerges within the
international community. The Martens Clause, as Judge Shahabuddeen points out, as a
customary rule with normative status40 provides us with effective means of foregoing the
belabored process of waiting for a positive norm to develop, and instead to rely on
“principles of international law derived from established custom”, “principles of
humanity”, and “dictates of public conscience” when defining war crime violations and
prohibitions.
For the purpose of this memorandum, I suggest that the Special Court employ a
somewhat liberal interpretation of the Martens Clause. This approach requires an analysis
and application of humanitarian laws, as well as an overview of various national antihazing laws and policies in order to establish hazing as a war crime.
IV. International Humanitarian Law
A. Making the Case: Hazing as Torture
Conventions and treaties on torture, as part of customary international law, are
especially useful in making out a legal case against violent military initiations and hazing.
Unlike the jurisdictional bases found in Articles 2 and 3 of the Statute for the Special
Court of Sierra Leone, these conventions and treaties do not apply solely to civilians or
prisoners of war. Rather, they are all-inclusive in the sense that they do not discriminate
on the basis of the status of the victim. However, making the case that hazing is torture is
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far from clear cut. Military commanders and human rights activists have been unable to
draw any meaningful distinction between abuse and acceptable military practices.41 Many
soldiers, for instance, recognize the brutality of hazing rituals but still believe them to be
important initiation rites that serve to create a strong bond within a military unit.42
Raymond J. Toney, a former military officer and Executive Director of the National
Interreligious Service Board for Conscientious Objectors (NISBCO) provides a unique
insight into this issue. Toney reports:
Characteristically, basic military training is a harsh environment in which
military officials intentionally subject recruits to high levels of stress and
physical exertion. Stress-inducing techniques include sleep deprivation,
prolonged physical exercises, and routine verbal abuse. Basic training is
also a “weeding out” process whereby superiors single out recruits posing
disciplinary problems for especially harsh treatment as a method of
assessing their ability to adapt to the military environment. Recruit-onrecruit abuse also occurs during the basic training phase, frequently under
the condoning glare of superiors. Recruits who appear weak and
defenseless may face violent assaults. . . In addition, conscientious
objectors often face severe physical assaults.43
Initiation practices and hazing range from being required to perform services for
tenured recruits to being subjected to severe beatings, even to the point of death.
Reported hazing incidents also include deprivation of food and sleep for excessive
periods, open-handed blows to the ears and head, requirements to masturbate in front of
other recruits, exercises that exceed normal physical endurance, forced eating of lighted
cigarettes, being urinated on, public insult, mockery and humiliation, and burning of
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genitalia with cigarettes.44 Despite such reported brutality, however, Toney warns against
drawing a hard-line parallel between hazing and torture: “One must distinguish carefully
between military rigor and abuse.”45 The “hazing-torture parallel”, then, has to be drawn
on a case-by-case basis, taking into consideration the context and the nature of the act.
The Youth Ambassadors for Peace, a subsection of the Free the Children movement, has
reported that the most common incidents of hazing in the RUF involve food deprivation,
amputation of fingers, noses, ears, and limbs, and execution.46 Considering the violent
and gruesome nature of these acts, it seems that they clearly fall into the category of
military abuse, rather than military rigor. An examination of the interpretation and
application of various torture prohibitions, then, proves exceptionally useful is providing
support for the proposition that acts of hazing properly fall into the category of torture.
i. The United Nations
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1970 states that “no one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.”47
Additionally, the General Assembly of the United Nations has declared that the dictates
of the Declaration constitute customary international law.48 The International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, Article VII, articulates that “[n]o one shall be
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subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment…”49 The
1984 Convention Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment defines torture as:
Any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him
or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he
or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or
at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official
or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.50
ii. The European Human Rights System
Article 3 of the 1953 Convention for the Protection and Fundamental Freedoms,
which governs all members of the European Union, states, “no one shall be subjected to
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”51 In the “Greek case”52, the
European Commission applied a flexible working definition and analysis to torture as it is
laid out in Article 3. The Commission stated:
The notion of inhuman treatment covers at least such treatment as
deliberately causes severe suffering, mental or physical, which has a
purpose, such as the obtaining of information or confession, or the
infliction of punishment, and is generally an aggravated form of inhuman
treatment. Treatment or punishment of an individual may be said to be
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degrading if it grossly humiliates him before others or drives him to act
against his will.53
In Ireland v. United Kingdom54, the European Court stated that certain necessary
inquiries must be made in cases of alleged torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment in order to determine if the act in question rises to the level of
torture. The Court stated that such inquiry depends on the circumstances and context of
the case, including the duration of the alleged abuse, its mental and/or physical effects,
and in some cases the sex, age, and state of health of the victim.55
iii. The Inter-American Human Rights System
Article 5 of the American Convention on Human Rights of 1969, entitled “Right
to Humane Treatment,” states that “no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,
inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment.”56 Moreover, Article 5 states that every
person has the right to the respect of their physical, mental, and moral integrity and that
punishment shall not extend to anyone other than criminals.57 In 1986, the Organization
of American States adopted the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish
Torture. Article 2 of the Inter-American Convention on Torture also gives a flexible
definition to the term. According to Article 2, torture is defined as “any act intentionally
performed whereby physical or mental pain or suffering is inflicted on a person for
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purposes of criminal investigation, as a means of intimidation, as a personal punishment,
as a preventative measure, as a penalty, or for any other purpose.”58 The Convention also
states:
Torture shall also be understood to be the use of methods upon a person
intended to obliterate the personality of the victim or to diminish his
physical or mental capacities, even if they do not cause physical pain or
mental anguish. The concept of torture shall not include physical or mental
pain or suffering that is inherent in or solely the consequence of lawful
measures, provided that they do not include the performance of the acts or
use of the methods referred to in this article.59
In the case of Egocheaga v. Peru60, the Inter-American Commission articulated
the Convention as a three-tier analysis for torture claims.61 To determine whether a claim
rises to the level of torture, the following three elements must be proved:
1. that the act was intentional and inflicted physical or mental pain and suffering
upon a person;
2. that the act was committed with a purpose; and
3. that the act was committed by a public official or by a private person acting at
the instigation of the former.62
iv. Synthesis of Understanding
As this analysis has demonstrated, current understandings on torture and cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment are imprecise and require a case by case analysis in
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order to determine whether a specific act rises to the level of torture. However, by
considering the similarities between all of the aforementioned treaties and conventions,
we may synthesize them into and create a roadmap of the necessary elements of torture.
For an act to rise to the level of torture, each of the following elements apparently need to
be present:
1. the intent to cause severe mental and/or physical pain;
2. A purpose, including, but not limited to, obtaining information during a
criminal investigation, punishing an individual for an act committed by himself or
a third party, or intimidating an individual; and
3. The act must be conducted by a state official, or an individual acting under
color of state authority.
Lacking these elements, an act may still rise to the level of inhuman and/or cruel
treatment. Note that the European Court in the case of Ireland v. United Kingdom63
emphasized the following elements in making a claim of inhuman and/or cruel treatment:
1. the nature and severity of physical or mental suffering;
2. the manner and method of infliction;
3. the age, sex, health, and maturity of the victim of the treatment; and
4. Whether the treatment forced the victim to act against his or her will.64
B. The Martens Clause and Conventions and Treaties on Torture
Although my legal research indicates that military hazing and initiation rites have
never been categorized so as to fall under the protection of the torture conventions and
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treaties, the fact that the conventions and treaties do not discriminate on the basis of
status indicates that all people, regardless of status, may claim protection against such
treatment. The context of military service, one scholar comments,
cannot be considered a mitigating factor in cases where the severity of
physical or psychological abuse results in significant short-term or
permanent disability. Treatment that results in psychological or
neurological damage, soft tissue injury, broken bones, or death is not
acceptable under any circumstances.
If a specific incident of military hazing meets the elements noted in the previous section,
then it seems that the act in question then falls into the category of torture. As such, the
victim, regardless of status, is protected under the appropriate convention or treaty. The
hazing incidents that are occurring in Sierra Leone, namely severe food deprivation,
forced amputations, and executions, clearly meet the aforementioned requirements; that
is, the acts are clearly committed with the intent to cause physical or mental pain, the acts
are committed with some definable purpose, and committed by an individual acting under
color of authority. Although the Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone does not
explicitly grant this Court jurisdiction to try people for torture violations committed
against members of their own army, the Martens Clause allows this court to look towards
the “principles of humanity” in determining whether such a prohibition does exist.
Employing the Martens Clause accordingly, we may confidently say that such a
prohibition does exist.
IV. Trends in International Law and Hazing
Customary international law “consists of rules of law derived from the consistent
conduct of States acting out of the belief that the law required them to act that way.”65

For a general principle to rise to the status of customary international law, therefore, it
must meet the following elements:
1. Widespread repetition by States of similar international acts over time. (State
practice)
2. Acts must occur out of sense of obligation. (opinion juris)
3. Acts must be taken by a significant number of States and not be rejected by a
significant number of States.
Unfortunately, the task of establishing policies and laws against hazing as
principles of customary international law is beyond the scope of this memorandum.
However, an analysis of some countries’ anti-hazing policies or laws is helpful in
demonstrating a global trend toward banning violent military initiation and hazing.
A. North America
i. United States
Military academies in the United States all have anti-hazing policies. In fact, as
early as the cadet stage, or initiation stage, there are statutes in place to regulate military
conduct. Incidents of hazing occurring in the U.S. Military Academy is subject to 10
U.S.C.S § 4352, which calls for the Superintendent of the Academy to define hazing, to
issue regulations to prevent such practices, and to issue regulations to punish any
occurrences with dismissal, suspension, or other adequate punishment.66 10 U.S.C.S §
9352 employs the same language as § 4352, and applies to the U.S. Air Force
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Academy.67 The U.S. Naval Academy is subject to 10 U.S.C.S § 6964 and, unlike § 4352
and § 9352, defines hazing. U.S.C.S § 6964 defines hazing as follows: “The term
‘hazing’ means any unauthorized assumption of authority by a midshipman whereby
another midshipman suffers or is exposed to any cruelty, indignity, humiliation, hardship,
or oppression, or the derivation or abridgement of any right.”68 The statute also states that
any midshipman guilty of hazing is potentially subject to suspension, dismissal, courtmartial direct, or even imprisonment.69
Interestingly enough, there is a discrepancy between the U.S. academy codes and
the codes that govern enlisted military. Unlike the laws governing academies, there are
no statutes explicitly prohibiting hazing in the U.S. military itself. In practice, however,
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), Article 93, applies to much of the
behavior thought of as hazing.70 Article 93 states: “Any person subject to this chapter . . .
who is guilty of cruelty toward, or oppression or maltreatment of, any person subject to
his orders shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.”71 Article 93, therefore, applies
to the conduct of a senior officer who orders those subject to him to perform some act,
whether the act is dangerous or humiliating.72 Additionally, conduct commonly thought
of as hazing is often prosecuted by charging the perpetrator with the actual act

67

10 U.S.C.S. § 9352 (2003). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 14.]

68

10 U.S.C.S. § 6964 (2003). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 13.]

69

Id.

70

Amie Pelletier, Regulation and Rites: The Effect and Enforecement of Current Anti-Hazing Statutes,
NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT (2002), at 396. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at
Tab 23.]
71

10 U.S.C.S. § 893 (2003). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 10.]

72

Pelletier, supra note 70, at 396. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook at Tab 23.]

committed.73 For example, UCMJ Article 128 states: “Any person subject to this
chapter…who attempts or offers with unlawful force or violence to do bodily harm to
another person, whether or not the attempt or offer is consummated, is guilty of assault
and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.”74 In the case of United States v.
Davis,75 the appeals court for the armed forces reversed the decision in a Marine Corps
Court of Criminal Appeals decision in a hazing case involving assault with a dangerous
weapon and attempted assault and battery.76 Although none of the perpetrators was
charged with hazing per se, the court drew a clear analogy to hazing by summarizing the
transpired event as follows: “[A]ppellant’s court-martial arose after he and numerous
others participated in a form of hazing known as a ‘blanket party’ or ‘fumble.’77 The
alleged purpose… is to censure Marines who do not live up to the expectations of their
organization.”78
ii. Canada
In the case of R. v. Paquette,79 the appellant had been charged with “permitt[ing]
teenaged cadets of both sexes to engage in degrading [sexual] activities while playing a
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game of ‘Truth or Dare.’”80 The activities in question included sexually suggestive
humping, as well as licking. Captain Luc Paquette “pled guilty to four counts of conduct
to prejudice good order and discipline under s. 129 of [the] National Defence Act and two
counts of sexual exploitation under s. 130 of [the] National Defence Act and s. 153(1) (b)
of [the] Criminal Code.”81 Paquette was sentenced to five months imprisonment. In
rejecting Captain Paquette’s request that the sentence be reduced to thirty days, the Court
Martial Appeal Court held:
A sentence of 30 days would not reflect the public interest in ensuring that
sexually degrading activities, or ‘hazing’, which may have been part of the
military culture in the past, are no longer acceptable. Protection of the
public through a sentence that incorporated the elements of general
deterrence and denunciation was of paramount importance in this case.82
B. The Philippines
In 1995, the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
passed Republic Act No. 8049, entitled “An Act Regulating Hazing and Other Forms of
Initiation Rites in Fraternities, Sororities, and Other Organizations and Providing
Penalties Therefor.”83 The Philippines government defined hazing as:

[A]n initiation rite or practice as a prerequisite for admission into membership in
a fraternity, sorority or organization by placing the recruit, neophyte or applicant
in some embarrassing or humiliating situations such as forcing him to do menial,
79
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Republic Act, No. 9049 (Phil.), available at www.upsilon.com/a/haze.shtml. [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook at Tab 8.]

silly, foolish and other similar tasks or activities or otherwise subjecting him to
physical or psychological suffering or injury.84
The Act further states that “[t]he term organization shall include any club or the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, Philippine National Police, Philippine Military
Academy, or officer and cadet corp of the Citizen’s Military Training and Citizen’s Army
Training.”85 In doing so, Republic Act No. 8049 effectively creates a blanket anti-hazing
policy that extends to the Philippines armed forces and all branches thereof.
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8049 states:
If the person subjected to hazing or other forms of initiation rights suffers
any physical injury or dies as a result thereof, the officers and members of
the fraternity, sorority or organization who actually participated in the
infliction of physical harm shall be liable as principals. . .86
The penalties set out by Section 4 range from life imprisonment if death, rape,
sodomy or mutilation results from the incident, to four years to six years if the hazing
victim suffered physical injuries that did not require medical attendance, nor prevented
him from habitual activity or work.87
C. Taiwan
The United States’ 2003 annual human rights report on Taiwan found that
“Taiwan’s overall human rights record improved last year…”88 One factor in this
determination was that “[c]orporal punishment is forbidden under military law and the
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Ministry of National Defense implemented several programs in recent years to address
the problem. . .”89 More specifically, as reprinted in the Taipei Times,
In 2002, a law was passed establishing committees for the protection and
promotion of servicemen’s rights and interests. [However], in November,
opposition legislators raised incidents of military hazing… Premier Yu
Shyi-kun has pledged to look into these cases and more actively ensure the
protection of human rights in the military.90
D. Republic of Kazakhstan
Despite the enactment of reforms designed to eliminate military conscription in
favor of the creation of a professional volunteer army, “[d]raft evasion and desertion are
[currently] widespread due to poor conditions and human rights violations within the
armed forces. Conscripts are allegedly subjected to brutal treatment to the extent that in
1998 the army launched a campaign to punish violators in a new anti-hazing policy.”91
The U.S. State Department, in its 1999 report on human rights in Kazakhstan, similarly
reported:
Army personnel continued to subject conscripts to brutal hazing, including
beatings and verbal abuse. No statistics were available on the extent of the
problem. The Army launched a campaign to punish violators of a new
anti-hazing policy in 1998, and the Government has taken action
occasionally against officials charged with abuses, often levying
administrative sanctions such as fines for those found guilty. A military
court in [the] Zhambul region sentenced a sergeant to death by firing
squad in December. The court ruled the man was guilty of killing two
persons and of desertion to avoid responsibility for beating a soldier under
him.92
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The Army’s new anti-hazing policy imposes administrative sanctions, and fines
found guilty of hazing.93 Since the inception of the program in 1998, the
government has reported a 50 percent decline in incidents of hazing.94 In 2002,
the government of Kazakhstan also initiated the December 2002 Humanization of
Criminal Justice Law, which, in part, strengthened sanctions of the Criminal Code
related to hazing.95 Additionally, “[t]he Army reported that 128 hazing cases were
opened during the first 9 months of the year. . .In the first 6 months of the year, 50
service members were convicted of hazing, and the Government reported that in
2002 military courts convicted 275 individuals of hazing or abuse.”96

E. Latvia
In 2002, the U.S. State Department’s annual human rights report on Latvia
reported that
There were no reports of the arbitrary or unlawful deprivation of life
committed by the Government or its agents. Fifteen members of the
army’s Special Operations Unit were convicted in May in connection with
the hazing death of a conscript in 2001. The ringleader was sentenced to
three years probation, and the other 14 soldiers received suspended
sentences. In addition, the army’s anti-hazing program was fully
established.97
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Since the establishment of the army’s anti-hazing program, no new instances of hazing
violations within Latvia’s military have been reported.
F. Russia
In 2004, the U.S. State Department reported serious incidents of hazing in Russia:
Various abuses against military servicemen, including . . . violent, at times
fatal hazing . . . continued during [2003]. On September 3, the chief
military prosecutor announced that approximately 2,000 hazing incidents
had been reported in the military in the first half of the year. . . He
estimated that 1,200 soldiers had died in non-combat situations in the first
half of the year, of which at least 16 were the result of hazing.98
In order to combat the military’s hazing problem, the chief military prosecutor, as
part of a national policy to eliminate occurrences of hazing in the Russian
military, opened over 300 criminal cases involving hazing incidents in the army
during the first part of 2003.99 Whether or not this new focus on perpetrators of
military hazing will have the desired effect will not be clear until the end of the
year, when a new report is created.
V. Conclusion
The Martens Clause of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions enables
the Special Court to look towards humanitarian law, customary international law, and
public sentiment in order to formulate war crime violations not explicitly set forth in the
Conventions themselves. This, in turn, allows us to make the argument that hazing is, in
fact, a war crime.
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As we have seen, humanitarian law, in the form of treaties and conventions,
provides strict prohibitions against torture. Moreover, unlike the Geneva Conventions,
these treaties and conventions against torture do not discriminate based on the status of
the victim of the crime. It therefore makes no difference if the person is a civilian, enemy
combatant, prisoner of war, or a member of the army committing the act. This seems
inherently to make sense in context, for if the hazing acts in question here were
performed on or committed against a civilian or an enemy combatant, the question of
illegality would be clear-cut and easy to determine.
Although a determination of whether prohibitions against hazing constitute
customary international law is beyond the immediate scope of this memorandum, a study
of international laws, policies, and trends against hazing suggest that such a prohibition
may, in fact, qualify as such.
By employing what we may take from humanitarian law and what we may take
from the study of practices of several nations, I believe that the Special Court may
successfully utilize the authority of the Martens Clause to properly categorize the act of
hazing in the RUF as a war crime.

